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FileURUGUAY52 official seriesPeriod2004 – 2026INE · BCU · MEF · Ministry of the Interior · MSP · INEEd · Latinobarómetro

Investigation · The country in numbers

Are we getting worse? It depends which year you compare against

Fifty-two official series, from 2004 to today, each found by one agent and then re-sourced by an independent verifier. Against 2004, 21 indicators improved and 2 got worse. Against 2014, 19 improved, 10 stalled and 4 got worse — and the ones that got worse are precisely the visible ones. Meanwhile 87% of Uruguayans are satisfied with their own life and only 41% think the country is progressing.

21 better / 2 worse vs 200410 stalled since 2014homicides x1.7me vs country gap: 46 points
21/2
Improved / worsened vs 2004
out of 37 comparable objective indicators
10
Stalled since 2014
only 2 did in the twenty-year comparison
×1,7
Homicides against 2004
6.0 → 10.3 per 100,000 people
46 pts
Me vs the country gap
87% satisfied with their life · 41% think the country progresses
The method

The trap is the year you compare against

Almost every argument about whether the country improved or worsened is won or lost on the choice of reference year, and almost nobody states it. 2004 is the floor of the worst economic crisis in Uruguayan history: poverty at 39.9%, unemployment at 13.1%, Central Government debt at 85.4% of GDP, sovereign debt rated junk. Comparing against that year flatters any present. It is true that we are far better off than in 2004, and it is also a rigged yardstick.

2014 is the other year, the one people use without saying so. It is the end of the commodity cycle, the point where most series stopped improving fast. Against 2014 the picture changes: stalled indicators go from 2 to 10, and the four that worsened are among the most visible there are. Someone who was twenty in 2014 is thirty-two today and has known no adult life other than the plateau. Their pessimism is chronologically coherent even when the long comparison is positive.

That is why every indicator here carries two verdicts rather than one. An indicator is marked "stalled" only inside a band — 5% relative, or an absolute band where the scale is bounded, as with PISA, Gini, HDI or rating notches — so that measurement noise does not read as change.

The two scoreboards, side by side

Against 2004-2006

  • 21improved
  • 2stalled
  • 2worsened
  • 12no data that year

Against 2014

  • 19improved
  • 10stalled
  • 4worsened
  • 4no data that year
What really did get worse

Seven deteriorations that admit no nuance

We start here rather than with the good news, because the complaint deserves to be answered first on what it gets right. Three of these seven have no 2004 anchor — the official series starts later — and are compared against the first available year, shown in each row.

  1. Homicides

    2004: 6.02025: 10.3per 100,000 people

    The indicator that vindicates the pessimism. Uruguay ran at about 6 homicides per 100,000 for thirty years (1989-2011). It jumped to 7.8 in 2012, to 12 in 2018, and settled near 10.3. Today's level is close to double the historical norm.

  2. Suicides

    2004: 15.92025: 19.2per 100,000 people

    The other unambiguous deterioration: 15.9 per 100,000 in 2004, a peak of 23.2 in 2022 and 19.16 in 2025. The break is 2015-2016 and it has not returned to the earlier level.

  3. Prison population

    2004: 213.62025: 459.7per 100,000 people

    213.6 per 100,000 in 2004, 459.7 in 2025: the prison population more than doubled and grew in almost every year. Marked neutral because it can read as more crime or as more punishment.

  4. Central Government debt

    2004: 85.42024: 65.3% of GDP

    85.4% of GDP in 2004 (the crisis hangover), 41.3% in 2014, 65.3% in 2024. Far better than twenty years ago, considerably worse than ten.

  5. Fiscal balance

    2016: -3.42025: -4.8% of GDP (negative = deficit)

    A deficit of 3.37% of GDP in 2016 and 4.81% in 2025. Not one year of surplus in the series.

  6. People in informal settlements

    2011: 165,2712023: 193,260people

    165,271 people in informal settlements in the 2011 census, 193,260 in 2023: 17% more people, while income poverty fell. Two things that should move together and do not.

  7. Unemployment

    2004: 13.12025: 7.5% of the labour force

    13.1% in 2004, 7.5% in 2025. Better than twenty years ago, worse than the 6.9% of 2014.

1989 – 2025

Uruguay's homicide rate sat at around 6 per 100,000 people for thirty years, from 1989 to 2011. It jumped to 7.8 in 2012, to 12.0 in 2018, and has since settled near 10.3. It was not a gradual deterioration: it was two steps, and today's level is close to double what this country lived with for three decades.

Homicides

per 100,000 people

Homicides per 100,000 people
YearHomicides
19896.4
19906.6
19916.2
19925.8
19937.3
19945.8
19955.9
19966.3
19977.4
19987.4
19996.5
20006.4
20016.5
20026.9
20035.9
20046.0
20055.6
20066.0
20075.8
20086.6
20096.7
20106.0
20115.8
20127.8
20137.6
20147.8
20158.5
20167.7
20178.2
201812.0
201911.2
20209.7
20218.7
202210.8
202310.7
202410.7
202510.3

Ministerio del Interior — Área de Estadística y Criminología Aplicada (AECA, ex Observatorio Nacional sobre Violencia y Criminalidad), Anuario AECA 2025, Tabla 2.1; población INE (Revisión 2013)

What contradicts the story

The crime most people actually suffer has been falling for six years

Reported robberies climbed from 524 per 100,000 people in 2013 to a peak of 871 in 2019: a 66% rise in six years. That period existed and was real, and it is probably where much of the discourse was formed. They have since fallen to 436 in 2025, the lowest value in the available series and 25% below 2014. Thefts follow the same path, more slowly.

What is left, then, is a diagnosis that was accurate between 2013 and 2019 and outlived the data that supported it. With one caveat worth keeping in view: homicides did not follow that fall. You can be safer from robbery and less safe from homicide at the same time, and that is exactly what the two series show.

Reported robberies

per 100,000 people

Reported robberies per 100,000 people
YearReported robberies
2013524
2014583
2015611
2016586
2017557
2018852
2019871
2020815
2021703
2022659
2023629
2024489
2025436

Ministerio del Interior — AECA, Anuario AECA 2025, Tabla 15.1 (Sistema de Gestión de Seguridad Pública); población INE (Revisión 2013)

The gap

I am fine, the country is not

The most important number in this investigation is not economic: it is the distance between two questions in the same survey. Asked about their own life, a Uruguayan answers from experience; asked about the country, they answer from what reaches them. The distance between the two answers was 31 points in 2013 and is 46 in 2024. It did not close: it widened while almost every hard indicator improved.

Satisfied with their own lifeThink the country is progressing
  1. 201350%81%31 points
  2. 201559%83%24 points
  3. 201822%77%55 points
  4. 202441%87%46 points

Corporación Latinobarómetro · only years when both questions were asked; nothing is interpolated

Why it feels worse

Six documented mechanisms, and two of them say the pessimism is right

This is not a list of other people's cognitive errors. Two of the six explain why a negative perception can be accurate, and one of them is the pollster's own warning about its most-quoted indicator.

"I am fine, the country is not"

About their own life people answer from experience; about the country they answer from what reaches them mediated. The two answers always separate in the same direction, and in Uruguay the gap did not close: it widened from 31 points in 2013 to 46 in 2024. It means the question "are we worse off?" does not measure the life of whoever answers it.

The evidence

Latinobarómetro on its own twenty-year series: "Latin Americans are all better off than they believe their countries are". In Uruguay: 81% satisfied with their life against 50% seeing the country progressing (2013); 87% against 41% (2024).

Corporación Latinobarómetro, Informes 2013, 2015 y 2024

"Insecurity is the main problem" measures fear, not crime

This is the pollster's own warning about its most-quoted indicator: the correlation with actual victimisation is nil. In 2024 Uruguay scored 35% and Honduras — the country with the region's highest homicide rate — just 12%. That many people name it does not say how much crime there is: it says how much fear there is, which is a real and different fact.

The evidence

Latinobarómetro 2024 report, verbatim: "there is no relationship at all between the number of victims and the share of the population naming crime as the main problem (…) This is a bad indicator of the real problem, and a very good indicator of the fear about it".

Corporación Latinobarómetro, Informe 2024 «La democracia resiliente», §1.5

The bar moves: what used to be tolerable no longer is

People do not compare today's country with 2004: they compare it with what they expect. When one urgency eases, the next problem moves to the top and the same objective level starts reading as unacceptable. That is how a perception indicator can worsen while the hard indicator improves, with nobody lying.

The evidence

Uruguay shows it in five years: insecurity as the main problem fell to 7% in August 2021, with the pandemic at the top of the agenda, and returned to 47% in March 2024 once that urgency eased. Latinobarómetro puts it as: "what was tolerable before is not tolerable today".

Corporación Latinobarómetro (Informes 2015 y 2016) y CIFRA (olas 2021 y 2024)

One domain really did get worse, and it colours the judgement of all the others

This one does not explain an error: it explains a correct judgement being generalised. Homicides doubled and are the most visible, most reportable, most present domain in daily conversation. When the question is open — "are we worse off?" — the domain that worsened answers for all the others, including those where the data improved. Whoever says "we are worse off" thinking about security is not wrong: they are answering a different question from the one about poverty or income.

The evidence

Ministry of the Interior: the homicide rate went from 6.0 per 100,000 in 2004 to a peak of 12.0 in 2018 and stood at 10.3 in 2025 — close to double the reference level, sustained for over five years.

Ministerio del Interior — Área de Estadística y Criminología Aplicada

The negativity bias is on the demand side, not just the supply side

It is not only that outlets pick bad news: audiences react more strongly to the negative, and that reaction is measurable in the body, not in what people say. That makes informational pessimism a stable equilibrium: the homicide story travels, the falling-poverty story does not.

The evidence

Soroka, Fournier and Nir measured skin conductance and heart rate against real TV stories in 17 countries across six continents: on average activation is higher for the negative. In Trussler and Soroka's earlier experiment, participants chose negative stories while stating they preferred good news.

PNAS, Soroka, Fournier & Nir (2019), 116(38); Trussler & Soroka (2014), IJPP 19(3)

Publics get the sign wrong, not just the level

Asked about the direction of a hard indicator — did homicides rise or fall since 2000? — the majority answers "rose" almost everywhere, including where they fell sharply. With a mandatory caveat: Uruguay was not in that sample, and here homicides did rise. The mechanism documents a direction bias in other countries; it does not prove Uruguayans are wrong about their own crime.

The evidence

Ipsos "Perils of Perception 2017", 38 countries and 29,133 interviews: only 7% correctly answered that their country's homicide rate was lower than in 2000, when across the set it had fallen 29%.

Ipsos, «The Perils of Perception» (Global Advisor, 2017 y 2018)
The scoreboard

All 52 indicators, one by one

Each row carries the full series, the values at the anchor years, both verdicts and a link to the official source. Grouped by theme. The dashed line in each sparkline marks 2014.

Showing 52 of 52 indicators.

Security and crime 5/5

Homicides

per 100,000 people · source ↗

2004
6.0
2014
7.8
2025
10.3
worsenedworsened

The indicator that vindicates the pessimism. Uruguay ran at about 6 homicides per 100,000 for thirty years (1989-2011). It jumped to 7.8 in 2012, to 12 in 2018, and settled near 10.3. Today's level is close to double the historical norm.

Reported robberies

per 100,000 people · source ↗

start
—
2014
582.7
2025
436.2
no data that yearimproved

The one that most contradicts the story: 582.7 in 2014, a peak of 870.8 in 2019 and 436.2 in 2025 — the lowest in the series and 25% below 2014. The crime most people actually suffer has been falling for six years.

Reported thefts

per 100,000 people · source ↗

start
—
2014
3,069.8
2025
2,795.7
no data that yearimproved

3,069.8 in 2014, 2,795.7 in 2025. Falling, though far less than robberies.

Femicides

cases per year · source ↗

start
—
2014
18.0
2025
18.0
no data that yearstalled

18 cases in 2014, 18 in 2025. No trend: the number oscillates and does not fall.

Prison population

per 100,000 people · source ↗

2004
213.6
2014
283.7
2025
459.7
no good direction

213.6 per 100,000 in 2004, 459.7 in 2025: the prison population more than doubled and grew in almost every year. Marked neutral because it can read as more crime or as more punishment.

Household economics 10/10

Poverty (persons) - 2006 line

% of people · source ↗

2004
39.9
2014
9.7
2024
8.3
improvedimproved

The biggest twenty-year change: 39.9% of people below the poverty line in 2004, 8.3% in 2024. Not linear — it bottomed at 7.9% (2017), rebounded to 11.6% in 2020 and only now sits lower.

Poverty (persons) - 2017 line

% of people · source ↗

start
—
2015
18.1
2025
16.6
no data that yearimproved

The same poverty measured against the new line (ENGIH 2016-17) gives 16.6% in 2025. It did not double: it is a stricter yardstick. Shown separately so neither series reads as a continuation of the other.

Extreme poverty

% of people · source ↗

2004
4.7
2014
0.3
2024
0.3
improvedstalled

4.7% in 2004, 0.3% since 2014. It fell to near-statistical disappearance and stayed there.

Child poverty (under 6)

% of children under 6 · source ↗

2006
53.4
2014
20.4
2023
20.1
improvedstalled

The uncomfortable one: overall poverty collapsed, child poverty has not moved since 2014 (20.4% → 20.1%). One in five children under 6 lives below the line.

Inequality (Gini)

index 0-1 · source ↗

2006
0.455
2014
0.381
2024
0.383
improvedstalled

Inequality fell sharply to 2014 (0.455 → 0.381) and has been stuck since (0.383 in 2024). The country became less unequal during the boom decade and then stopped.

Real wages

index 2004=100 · source ↗

2004
100.0
2014
151.5
2025
169.0
improvedimproved

The 2025 real wage is 69% above 2004 — but 2004 was the floor of the crisis. Against the year 2000 the gain is 32% over 25 years, and 2020-2022 saw three consecutive years of decline.

Unemployment

% of the labour force · source ↗

2004
13.1
2014
6.9
2025
7.5
improvedworsened

13.1% in 2004, 7.5% in 2025. Better than twenty years ago, worse than the 6.9% of 2014.

Informal employment

% of workers · source ↗

2006
35.0
2014
24.9
2025
21.9
improvedimproved

35% of workers off the books in 2006, 21.9% in 2025. A sustained fall, including after 2014.

Annual inflation

% annual change (Dec/Dec) · source ↗

2004
7.6
2014
8.3
2025
3.7
improvedimproved

7.6% in 2004, 8.3% in 2014, 3.7% in 2025. Prices still rise; they have not risen this slowly in decades.

GDP per capita (PPP)

constant 2021 PPP USD · source ↗

2004
17,519
2014
28,935
2025
32,742
improvedimproved

From USD 17,519 (2004) to USD 32,742 (2025) in constant PPP dollars: output per head nearly doubled.

Health 5/5

Suicides

per 100,000 people · source ↗

2004
15.9
2014
17.4
2025
19.2
worsenedworsened

The other unambiguous deterioration: 15.9 per 100,000 in 2004, a peak of 23.2 in 2022 and 19.16 in 2025. The break is 2015-2016 and it has not returned to the earlier level.

Life expectancy

years · source ↗

2004
75.3
2014
77.2
2024
78.3
improvedimproved

75.3 years in 2004, 78.3 in 2024: almost three more years of life in two decades.

Infant mortality

deaths under age 1 per 1,000 live births · source ↗

2004
13.2
2014
7.8
2024
6.5
improvedimproved

13.2 deaths per 1,000 live births in 2004, 6.5 in 2024. Halved.

Teenage motherhood

births per 1,000 women aged 15-19 · source ↗

2004
59.8
2014
58.2
2024
25.1
improvedimproved

59.8 births per 1,000 teenagers in 2004, 25.1 in 2024: a 58% fall. One of the largest social shifts of the period, and barely discussed.

Smoking

% of people aged 15-65 · source ↗

2006
34.0
2014
29.5
2024
24.2
improvedimproved

34% smokers in 2006, 24.2% in 2024. Public policy that worked and goes largely unnoticed.

Education 3/3

Upper-secondary completion

% of people aged 21-23 · source ↗

2006
32.2
2014
38.6
2025
56.4
improvedimproved

Stuck near 38% between 2011 and 2016, it only took off in the 2020s: 56.4% in 2025. It still means four in ten 21-to-23-year-olds did not finish secondary school, with the official 75% target missed by two governments.

PISA - reading

mean PISA score · source ↗

2006
413.0
2015
437.0
2022
430.0
stalledstalled

413 in 2006, 430 in 2022. Within the test's noise: sixteen years of neither improvement nor decline.

PISA - maths

mean PISA score · source ↗

2006
427.0
2015
418.0
2022
409.0
stalledstalled

427 in 2006, 409 in 2022. The one of the two pointing down, though also within the margin.

Services, housing and infrastructure 9/9

Households with internet

% of households · source ↗

start
—
2013
65.0
2024
94.0
no data that yearimproved

65% of households connected in 2013, 94% in 2024.

Fixed broadband

per 100 people · source ↗

2004
0.8
2014
25.0
2024
33.0
improvedimproved

0.82 connections per 100 people in 2004, 33 in 2024. From almost nothing to the top of the region.

Households with fixed broadband

% of households · source ↗

start
—
2013
55.0
2024
73.0
no data that yearimproved

55% of households with fixed broadband in 2013, 73% in 2024.

Renewable electricity

% of total generation · source ↗

2004
81.7
2014
94.4
2025
98.2
improvedstalled

81.7% of electricity generation in 2004, 98.2% in 2025. The energy transition is not a plan: it already happened.

Mains sewerage

% of households · source ↗

2006
56.7
2014
61.4
2023
62.2
improvedstalled

56.7% of households in 2006, 62.2% in 2023. It rose little and has barely moved for a decade.

People in informal settlements

people · source ↗

start
—
2014
—
2023
193,260
no data that yearno data that year

165,271 people in informal settlements in the 2011 census, 193,260 in 2023: 17% more people, while income poverty fell. Two things that should move together and do not.

Unmet basic needs

% of people · source ↗

start
—
2014
—
2011
33.8
no data that yearno data that year

33.8% of people with at least one unmet basic need in the 2011 census. A census figure, not an annual one: the next comparison depends on 2023 census processing.

Road deaths

per 100,000 people · source ↗

start
—
2014
15.6
2025
13.5
no data that yearimproved

15.6 deaths per 100,000 in 2014, 13.5 in 2025 — with nearly 50% more vehicles per head on the road.

Vehicles per head

per 1,000 people · source ↗

start
—
2014
604.7
2025
896.9
no good direction

604.7 vehicles per 1,000 people in 2014, 896.9 in 2025. Traffic did not worsen by accident: there are nearly 50% more cars per person in eleven years.

State, macro and institutions 8/8

Central Government debt

% of GDP · source ↗

2004
85.4
2014
41.3
2024
65.3
improvedworsened

85.4% of GDP in 2004 (the crisis hangover), 41.3% in 2014, 65.3% in 2024. Far better than twenty years ago, considerably worse than ten.

Gross public-sector debt

% of GDP · source ↗

start
—
2014
—
2025
75.0
no data that yearno data that year

58.2% of GDP in 2016, 75% in 2025. The current official series does not reach 2014, so the long contrast uses the Central Government one.

Fiscal balance

% of GDP (negative = deficit) · source ↗

start
—
2014
—
2025
-4.8
no data that yearno data that year

A deficit of 3.37% of GDP in 2016 and 4.81% in 2025. Not one year of surplus in the series.

Sovereign rating

notches: 6=B3 - 9=Ba3 - 12=Baa3 (investment grade) - 14=Baa1 - 21=Aaa · source ↗

2004
6
2014
13
2025
14
improvedstalled

From B3 — junk — in 2004 to Baa1 in 2025. Uruguay regained investment grade in 2012 and kept climbing notches.

Tax take

% of GDP · source ↗

2004
22.3
2014
25.1
2024
27.3
no good direction

22.3% of GDP in 2004, 27.3% in 2024. Neutral by definition, but it is the number behind "everything is expensive": the State collects five points of GDP more than twenty years ago.

Human Development Index

index 0-1 · source ↗

2004
0.779
2014
0.816
2023
0.862
improvedimproved

0.779 in 2004, 0.862 in 2023. Uruguay sits in the very-high human development group.

Democracy Index

score 0-10 (>=8.0 = full democracy) · source ↗

2006
7.96
2014
8.17
2025
8.92
improvedimproved

7.96 in 2006, 8.92 in 2025. Uruguay is one of the world's few "full democracies" and its score rose while the regional average fell.

Corruption perceptions

score 0-100 (100 = least corruption perceived) · source ↗

start
—
2014
73.0
2025
73.0
no data that yearstalled

73 out of 100 in 2014, 73 in 2025. Uruguay remains Latin America's best-rated and has neither improved nor worsened in eleven years.

Perception — not in the tally 8/8

These series measure what people believe, not what happens. They are shown because they are the other half of the question, and left out of the tally above so an opinion does not become a fact.

Satisfaction with one's own life

% very or fairly satisfied · source ↗

start
—
2013
81.0
2024
87.0
no data that yearimproved

87% of Uruguayans say they are satisfied with their own life in 2024, against 81% in 2013. The second-highest reading in the region.

"The country is progressing"

% saying "it is progressing" · source ↗

start
—
2013
50.0
2024
41.0
no data that yearworsened

41% believe the country is progressing (2024), against 50% in 2013 and 58% in 2009. Against the 87% content with their own life, the gap is 46 points.

"The country's economy is doing well"

% "very good" + "good" · source ↗

2007
23.0
2013
47.0
2024
33.0
improvedworsened

33% rate the country's economic situation as good (2024), against 47% in 2013. It fell while GDP per head rose.

Satisfaction with democracy

% very or fairly satisfied · source ↗

2004
45.0
2013
82.0
2024
63.0
improvedworsened

82% satisfaction with how democracy works in 2013, 63% in 2024. A sharp fall, but still well above the 45% of 2004.

Support for democracy

% who agree · source ↗

2004
78.0
2013
71.0
2024
70.0
worsenedstalled

78% in 2004, 70% in 2024. Support for democracy as a system fell eight points in twenty years.

Trust in government

% with a lot or some trust · source ↗

start
—
2014
—
2024
49.0
no data that yearno data that year

39% in 2017, 49% in 2024.

Trust in political parties

% with a lot or some trust · source ↗

2007
34.0
2014
—
2024
36.0
improvedno data that year

34% in 2007, 36% in 2024. Unmoved.

Insecurity as the main problem

% of the population · source ↗

start
—
2014
—
2024
35.0
no data that yearno data that year

Between 20% and 44% name insecurity as the main problem depending on year and pollster. The series splices sources and does not support a trend reading: it is an order of magnitude, not a curve.

Transparency — not in the tally 4/4

They come from this site's own procurement data. They mostly measure how much more the State publishes, not how much more it spends — hence their exclusion from the scoreboard.

Bodies publishing their purchases

public bodies · source ↗

2004
182
2014
234
2025
275
no good direction

110 public bodies published their purchases in 2002, 278 in 2024. This page exists because that number grew.

Procurement records published

procurement records · source ↗

2004
30,844
2014
36,436
2025
109,466
no good direction

14,327 procurement records published in 2002, 129,965 in 2024. It measures how much is disclosed, not how much is spent.

Suppliers with a public record

awarded suppliers · source ↗

2004
4,205
2014
5,323
2025
11,759
no good direction

2,870 suppliers with a public award in 2002, 11,759 in 2025.

Published awarded total

USD millions disclosed · source ↗

2004
681
2014
928
2025
4,375
no good direction

Published awarded totals went from USD 451 M (2002) to USD 5,353 M (2024). It mostly measures how much more is disclosed: hence its place here and not in the scorecard above.

Careful with the "stalled" ones

Three of the ten indicators stalled since 2014 are against the ceiling, not stuck through failure: extreme poverty stayed at 0.3% because there is almost nowhere left to fall, renewable electricity at 98.2% for the same reason, and corruption perceptions at 73 points while remaining the best in Latin America. The other seven — inequality, child poverty, femicides, secondary completion, PISA, sewerage — are the kind of stagnation that hurts.

One indicator this site can measure on its own

Twenty years ago this page could not have been written

In 2002, 110 State bodies published their purchases and 14,327 records were left for the year. In 2024 it was 278 bodies and 129,965 records. The database this site runs on exists because that number grew, and it is itself one of the things that improved: the Uruguayan State of 2004 was not cleaner, it was less observable.

The flip side is that the same growth makes any naive reading of published spending misleading. The awarded total in the data went from USD 451 million in 2002 to USD 5,353 million in 2024, but that mostly measures how much purchasing started leaving a trace. Which is why these four series sit down here and not in the scoreboard above.

See the spending evolution with the full bridge →

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How to read this investigation

This is not an optimistic or a pessimistic report: it is a count. Every indicator was classified by the same mechanical rule, without picking which to show. The ones that worsened come first and by name. If the result leans towards improvement it is because the series lean that way, not because the series were chosen.

A national average hides a distribution. Poverty falling to 8.3% says nothing about who was left inside: child poverty is still 20.1% and secondary completion is 30.5% in the lowest socioeconomic level against 84.8% in the highest. A country indicator improving is compatible with many people doing worse.

The series have breaks and they are flagged. Poverty appears twice because INE changed the line in 2017 and the two measurements are not continuous. Crime recording only reached national coverage in 2013. Perception data splices pollsters. Where a break exists it is stated in the row.

Verification, not trust. Every external series was researched by one agent and then re-sourced by an independent verifier instructed to discard rather than publish: of 49 series, 43 were confirmed unchanged, 6 were corrected — nearly all survey figures — and none survived without a source. The 4 procurement ones come from the site's own data.

None of this tells you how to feel. The data answers "did it change?", not "is it enough?". Infant mortality halving does not make the current level acceptable, and robberies falling gives nothing back to whoever was robbed last month.

Sources

Every series links to the official publication it comes from. No figure on this page was computed by hand except the four procurement ones, which come from the site's own data.