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The housing the state does not buy
Law 18.795 waives taxes for developers who build promoted housing. It is Uruguay's largest housing policy of the past fifteen years and it leaves not one contract in the public procurement record. This is what can be measured, and what the state does not publish.
This site measures what the state buys. Every peso here has a contract, a supplier and a file anyone can open. Promoted housing has none of that: it is not a purchase, it is a tax the state chooses not to collect. It generates no contracts, never passes through the procurement system, and therefore leaves no trace in the record this site indexes.
That absence is the reason for this piece. The regime is fifteen years old, it promoted 52,713 homes and finished 30,525. The estimate of what the state gave up is published by the tax office in five separate lines, with no consolidated total, and only from the 2015 tax year onward, because before that its sources did not allow a reliable estimate.
When a member of parliament wanted to know how much had been waived between 2012 and 2025, he had to ask the Ministry of Economy. The Housing Ministry had previously replied that it could only report VAT, because it did not hold the other data.
Method
Why this investigation carries no table of contracts
Every other investigation on this site ends in a search anyone can repeat. This one cannot. The state pays nobody to build promoted housing: it forgives taxes to whoever builds it privately and sells it on the market. The money never enters or leaves a public account, so there is no spending officer, no award and no ocid.
What does appear in the procurement record are the works the Housing Ministry and the National Housing Agency contract in their own name, which are a different thing on a different budget. Confusing the two is the commonest error in Uruguay's housing debate.
A tax-exemption regime is as legitimate a policy instrument as a tender. The difference is oversight: a tender leaves a file that can be audited, and an exemption leaves an estimate published in aggregate, late, and not broken down by territory or housing type.
What the law says, and who signs
Article 4 of Law 18.795 empowers the Executive to grant seven benefits, from paragraph A) to G). The law does not exempt by itself: it enables. The taxes it names are those on income, the wealth tax, VAT and the property transfer tax.
The import VAT exemption is not in the law. It is in article 10, paragraph e), of Decree 355/011, as worded by Decree 129/020. It covers only VAT, not customs duties.
Article 5 creates the Advisory Commission on Social-Interest Housing Investment. The National Housing Agency acts as adviser to that commission and must rule on every initiative. Both opinions are mandatory to obtain and neither is binding: the promotional declaration is issued by the Executive.
Decree 355/011 was enacted on 6 October 2011 and signed by José Mujica in cabinet. IMPO records eleven decrees touching it: the base decree and ten amendments, the last from February 2022. The current government's Five-Year Plan counts four regulatory changes. They count different things, and either number obliges you to say which.
What was built
Approved and built are not the same, and the distinction is lost constantly.
As of 31 July 2026 the National Housing Agency counts 1,824 promoted projects, with 52,713 homes. Another 186 projects, with 10,535 homes, were still under review. In total 2,200 projects entered and 190 did not proceed, through investor withdrawal or revocation.
As of 30 April 2026 there were 30,525 homes finished and 12,962 under construction. Works began on 1,616 projects, involving 1,693 building works, of which 1,263 were completed. The count of finished projects differs from finished works because one project may include several works. Works never began on 141 projects, with 5,541 homes.
For scale: as of 31 December 2015 the regime had 2,867 homes finished and 6,245 under construction. Most of what exists today was built afterwards.
The ANV measures through site visits by its own architects, not from an administrative register. And it publishes cumulative stock in each report, not annual flow: that is why this site publishes no series of homes finished per year. Subtracting two consecutive reports would give that flow, but it would be our calculation on someone else's series.
From entered to finished
The first two steps are as of 31/07/2026 and the rest as of 30/04/2026. Different cut-offs: they are not subtracted from one another.
What the state gives up
Five separate lines, editions that do not agree, and no published total.
The tax office estimates the regime's tax expenditure in five lines: VAT, corporate income tax, wealth tax, property transfer tax and non-resident income tax. It publishes each separately and publishes no consolidated line for Law 18.795. Adding them would produce our figure, not an official one, so they are not added here.
The costliest line is the VAT exemption on sales of new covered homes: 3,399,976,790 pesos in 2023, per the 2021-2024 edition. The fastest-growing in relative terms is the property transfer tax, which in the 2022-2025 edition multiplies by 2.6 between 2022 and 2025.
The tax office revises its own figures between editions, and its projections miss in both directions. Corporate income tax for 2022 was projected at 993,170,794 pesos and later estimated at 637,015,036: the projection was 55% too high. For 2024 it was projected at 816,292,363 and later estimated at 1,226,819,063: 33% too low. This is not an error by the agency; it is the limit of headlining with a projection.
On 14 April 2026 deputy Gustavo Salle Lorier asked the Ministry of Economy for the amounts waived between 2012 and 2025 under corporate income tax, wealth tax and property transfer tax. In the filing he recorded that the Housing Ministry had previously answered it could only report VAT, because it held no other data. The Ministry of Economy replied on 14 May, forwarding the tax office figures: a series starting in 2015 and excluding 2025, because that year's estimates had not yet been submitted for approval.
Tax expenditure measures the value of the exception, not the revenue that would be collected if the exception were removed. The tax office says so in its own report. Any reading along the lines of "this money could have gone elsewhere" exceeds what the source supports.
Tax expenditure estimated by the tax office, by tax
Current Uruguayan pesos. One series per report edition, never spliced: the tax office revises backwards. The last point of each edition is a projection.
VAT A_59
Corporate income tax B_19
Wealth tax C_10
Property transfer tax G_4
Non-resident income tax F_10
A July 2025 paper by Cooperativa Comuna, commissioned by the FECOVI board, estimates the regime's share of forgone revenue in 2023 at US$ 106 million — 29% of the direct budget execution of the housing programme area, which it puts at US$ 372 million. It is the authors' own calculation on tax office, central bank and budget office data, not an official figure.
What kind of unit was built
The regime changed product without changing law.
The eligible habitable-area envelope ran from 32 to 107 square metres in 2011. Decree 249/018, of August 2018, moved it to 35–125 and stated its purpose was to align the regulation with Law 19.581, which had changed minimum housing standards. Decree 129/020, of April 2020, added a new 25-to-40 square metre type for studio units.
Between April 2020 and December 2024, 61% of the promoted homes approved nationwide are studios or one-bedroom units: 13,942 of 22,706. Slightly over 50% are one-bedroom, 11,674, and 10% are studios, 2,268. The figure comes from a study by architects Alina del Castillo and Graciela Lamoglie, of the Faculty of Architecture, Design and Urbanism, reported by El Observador.
The 10% and the 61% are the two figures of the same argument and both are correct. The 10% counts studios. The 61% adds studios and one-bedroom units. Picking one and omitting the other is what turns the datum into ammunition.
The authors propose regulating the share of promoted housing by number of bedrooms, to prevent developments from responding only to maximising land returns. The national housing director, Milton Machado, attributed the trend to a cultural and structural change in Uruguayan families and said he opposed banning studios by law.
Composition of what was approved, April 2020 to December 2024
Out of 22,706 homes, nationwide. FADU-Udelar study reported by El Observador.
Average price by unit type, Montevideo
Rolling year to April 2026, in dollars. The same report records 254,980 for three-bedroom units in its Table 4.
At what price, and for whom
In dollars the series rises. In inflation-indexed units, it does not. Both are published.
The ANV publishes the average sale price per square metre built of promoted housing in Montevideo, by half-year, from 2012. In dollars it went from 1,396 in the second half of 2012 to 2,477 in the first half of 2026. In inflation-indexed units the same series runs from 11,094 to 15,073, and its peak is not the last point: it is 17,302, in the second half of 2021.
The national average for the rolling year to April 2026 is 2,450 dollars and 15,369 indexed units per square metre built. It rose 6.3% in dollars and fell 1.3 in indexed units against the previous rolling year. The two currencies tell different stories, which is why they travel together.
The average floor area of the unit sold in Montevideo fell from 64 square metres in the first half of 2017 to 59 in the first half of 2026. The fall and the addition of the studio type to the regulation coincide in time. No verified study establishes that one caused the other.
Investors filed 26,242 sworn sale declarations up to 1 May 2026, and Montevideo accounts for 79.7%.
Research by the University of the Republic presented to the Housing Advisory Commission concludes that only the fourth and fifth income quintiles can obtain mortgage credit to buy one of these homes. From the third quintile access is possible through renting, taking up to 30% of household income. The same team concludes that, with the data analysed, it is not possible to determine that affordability improved for the beneficiaries the law explicitly names.
The only peer-reviewed causal study of the regime is by Nicolás González-Pampillón, published in Regional Science and Urban Economics in 2022. It measures that the regime raised the price of nearby existing housing by 12%, for a one-standard-deviation increase in exposure intensity, and that the effect fades about 200 metres from the boundary. The author notes there were no explicit rules on the socioeconomic characteristics of buyers or tenants, and that developers ended up building for middle and high income households. His price data run to 2018, before the regime's highest-volume stretch.
Sale price per square metre built, Montevideo
Promoted housing, by half-year. In dollars the series rises; in indexed units it does not. 2012_1 has 6 cases and 2026_1 is a partial half-year.
| Half-year | Dollars / m² | Indexed units / m² | m² | Cases | Report |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2012_1 | 1,337 | 11,144 | 63 | 6 ⚠ | N° 36 |
| 2012_2 | 1,396 | 11,094 | 67 | 71 | N° 36 |
| 2013_1 | 1,514 | 11,339 | 67 | 192 | N° 36 |
| 2013_2 | 1,728 | 13,901 | 66 | 277 | N° 36 |
| 2017_1 | 1,884 | 14,879 | 64 | 824 | N° 50 |
| 2021_2 | 2,026 | 17,302 | 63 | 145 | N° 36 |
| 2022_1 | 2,013 | 15,682 | 60 | 778 | N° 50 |
| 2024_1 | 2,301 | 14,918 | 60 | 1,206 | N° 50 |
| 2024_2 | 2,263 | 15,441 | 59 | 1,254 | N° 50 |
| 2025_1 | 2,318 | 15,515 | 58 | 1,133 | N° 50 |
| 2025_2 | 2,415 | 15,075 | 59 | 1,118 | N° 50 |
| 2026_1 | 2,477 | 15,073 | 59 | 380 ◑ | N° 50 |
Regional Science and Urban Economics 92 (2022)
The only peer-reviewed causal study measures a 12% rise in the price of nearby existing housing, fading about 200 metres from the boundary. Its price data run to 2018.
Ciudad de la Costa
The case where the product the regime actually produced becomes visible.
Canelones is the department with the highest price per square metre built in promoted housing in the country: 2,845 dollars and 17,885 indexed units in the rolling year to April 2026, against 2,411 and 15,125 for Montevideo, and 2,450 for the country as a whole. The table covers six departments, because the ANV excludes those with fewer than ten sworn declarations in the period.
The ANV attributes the department's trajectory to one locality. In Ciudad de la Costa the square metre built of promoted housing is 25% more expensive than in Montevideo measured in dollars, and 26% measured in indexed units.
The gap narrowed. The previous report, covering the rolling year to December 2025, measured it at 28% and 29%. And the locality is growing more slowly than its department: Canelones rose 11.1% in dollars and 3.2% in indexed units against the previous rolling year, while Ciudad de la Costa rose 9.8% and 2.1%. The boom in the headline describes a movement already slowing.
71% of Canelones' 2025 sworn sale declarations correspond to homes in Ciudad de la Costa, and the ANV itself notes that this count is lower than in earlier reports. In August 2026 a figure of 87% for that same share circulated in the press. That number is not in the ANV report the articles cite by name, and we found no public document supporting it.
The close returns the piece to its axis. There is no official figure for how much tax was given up in Ciudad de la Costa, nor for how many promoted homes were finished there. The tax office does not break tax expenditure down by territory, and the ANV breaks finished homes down by department, not by locality. The only territorial construction figure is departmental: 2,390 homes finished in all of Canelones as of 30 April 2026.
Price per square metre built, by department
Rolling year to April 2026. Six departments: the ANV excludes those with fewer than ten sworn declarations in the period.
The channel that did aim at the target population
Inside the regime, the state designed a targeted programme: Entre Todos — Sueños en Obra, created by Decree 59/022 in February 2022. According to the current Housing Ministry's assessment of the previous administration, that channel did not work as expected.
In Entre Todos families never gained access by public ballot. From the start the only route was a list of applicants that the developer firms themselves submitted to the ministry. By the end of 2024 the programme recorded 76 projects entered for some 4,950 homes, with 376 finished between 2022 and 2024 and 488 under construction.
Nine SiGa Entre Todos guarantees were granted, eight of them signed in late February 2025. No project used ministry co-financing. Of the 10 million dollars transferred in 2022 to the co-investment trust, 9 million returned to general revenue in late 2024, at the Ministry of Economy's request, because no co-investment project materialised.
The ministry describes the programme's impact as limited and attributes it to delays in setting up the instruments. It also notes that the siting of several projects in areas without services is a critical aspect distinguishing it from the ministry's other programmes. All these judgements are the Housing Ministry's about the previous administration, and must be read that way.
Decree 130/026, published on 25 June 2026, re-worded six articles of the decree that created the programme. The new article 14 no longer sets a percentage or a term for the economic contribution: it refers to Law 13.728 and lets the National Housing Directorate define conditions according to budget availability. The previous text did set figures, up to 30% of the financed price for a minimum of five years.
Several July 2026 articles claim the decree requires at least half the homes to go to public ministry calls. None of the six amended articles contains that percentage. And no 2026 decree amended Decree 355/011: what changed in 2026 is the Entre Todos programme, not the general regime.
Where the sources do not agree
These go in the body, not in a footnote, because they show how an official source is read.
The ANV contradicts itself three times in the same report
In report N° 50, Table 2 gives 2,173 dollars for Maldonado while the prose on page 4 says 2,108, which is Colonia's value. The prose says 254,890 dollars for three-bedroom units in Montevideo and Table 4 says 254,980. The prose gives 15,379 indexed units for Montevideo in the first half of 2026 and Table 3 gives 15,073. In all three we publish the table and cite it as the table.
The count of homes does not agree across sources
The ANV publishes 1,824 promoted projects with 52,713 homes out of 2,200 entered. Ámbito published in March 2026, using ANV data, 2,110 projects submitted and 62,000 homes projected, of which 47,000 approved. These are different cut-offs and different definitions of "promoted". We publish both, with their dates, without choosing.
The ANV's tax expenditure and the tax office's are not comparable
The ANV measures VAT refunds on direct construction costs. The tax office measures, in line A_59, the VAT exemption on sales. They are two different concepts: never added, and never compared without saying this.
The causal study has two figures depending on the version
The CEP-LSE working paper of November 2019 says "between 12 and 17%". The peer-reviewed version, published in 2022, says 12%. We cite the peer-reviewed one and declare that the other exists.
What cannot be asserted
Every question left unanswered, and why it has no answer.
About the money
- What the regime cost in total. The tax office publishes five separate lines and no consolidated one. Adding them produces our figure.
- What it cost in dollars. The tax office publishes current pesos. Converting requires an exchange rate from another source and comparing years requires deflating. Neither operation is in the source.
- What it cost between 2012 and 2014. The tax office stated its sources allow reliable estimates only from the 2015 tax year.
- What it cost in 2025 and 2026. The 2025 figure is a projection in every available edition. For 2026 no estimate exists.
- What was given up in Ciudad de la Costa, in Canelones or in any department. The tax office does not break tax expenditure down by territory.
- What one home is exempted, and what studios cost. The tax office breaks the figure down neither per unit nor by housing type.
About the homes
- How many were finished each year. The ANV publishes cumulative stock, not flow. Subtracting reports would be our calculation.
- How many are rented out. The promotional declaration requires investors to declare tenancy contracts to the ANV. The ANV publishes only the sworn sale declarations. The data exists in the state's hands and is not released.
- How many sit empty or on short-term rental. The 2023 census measures unoccupied dwellings but does not cross that with the regime, and there is no official short-term-rental source.
- Who bought. The ANV does not break the figure down by buyer type, residence or declared use. The university study says who can buy, not who bought.
- How many were finished in Ciudad de la Costa. The ANV breaks finished homes down by department, not by locality.
About causes
- Whether the regime made promoted housing cheaper. The only peer-reviewed causal study measures the spillover onto nearby existing stock, not the price of the exempted unit.
- Whether the 12% effect still holds. That study's price data run to 2018, before the highest-volume stretch.
- Whether the 2020 regulatory change caused the fall in floor area. The two coincide in time and no verified study establishes cause.
About what we looked for and did not find
- We found no report by the Court of Auditors or the national internal audit office on the regime. We searched the Court's site, its resolutions search, its annual reports and parliament's objections page. Only the opinion on the ANV's balance sheet as a body appears. This is published as a search without result, not as a claim that no audit exists.
- The text of the regulation in force, Ministerial Resolution 774/2022, could not be read: the PDF the ANV publishes is a scan with no text layer.
- The 87% share of Ciudad de la Costa in Canelones sales circulated in the press with no public document supporting it.
The framing, stated outright
None of the above describes an irregularity. Article 4 of Law 18.795 empowers the Executive to grant the benefits, and each promotional declaration is an act of the Executive, following mandatory opinions from the National Housing Agency and the Advisory Commission. The argument is about the design of a public policy, not about its legality.
What this piece does hold is simpler. Fifteen years on, the state cannot say what the regime cost in total, nor per home, nor where. It can say how many homes were built, because an architect visits them. The asymmetry between those two capabilities is a choice, not an accident, and it is why this text cannot end in a search box.
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How to read this investigation
This is an analysis of public procurement data, which is public record. It documents verifiable facts — amounts, dates, suppliers, procurement method — and flags patterns worth scrutiny, keeping proven facts apart from open questions.
An exception purchase, a high price or supplier concentration is not, on its own, proof of wrongdoing. Many contracts may have valid administrative justification. The goal is to enable citizen oversight, not to issue a verdict.
Companies and people are named only as state suppliers, as they appear in the official system. Anyone named may add their response or correct a figure, and it will be incorporated.